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711 
RULING OUTER SPACE: DEFINING 
THE BOUNDARY AND DETERMINING 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
ALEX S. LI* 
“If some acts be examinable, and others not, there must be some rule of law to 
guide . . . the exercise of . . . jurisdiction.”
1
 These words in Marbury v. Madison 
laid the groundwork for a bedrock legal principle: judicial review.
2
 Written by 
Chief Justice John Marshall in 1803, Marbury v. Madison has stood the test of 
time.
3
 The concept it espoused has empowered countless American courts to 
legitimately assert their authorities and interpretations of law on a wide range of 
issues. But, in establishing the judiciary’s authority to interpret the law, Marbury 
v. Madison has also defined the contours and limitations of such authority.
4
 For a 
court to issue a valid and enforceable judgment, the opinion dictates that such 
court must have valid jurisdiction over the issue at hand. Without such 
jurisdiction, “its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not 
voidable, but simply void . . . . They constitute no justification; and all persons 




Worldwide, the jurisprudence regarding jurisdictional authority has undergone 
continual refinement throughout the years. Complex and uncertain, jurisdictional 
issues involving parties of different nationalities and disputes rooted in 
                                                                                                             
 * In-house counsel by day, Outer Space blogger at #TheSpaceBar
®
 
(www.thespacebar.space) by night. 2014-2015 law clerk to the Honorable Robert E. Bacharach of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; Gunderson Dettmer, Latham, and PwC alumnus. 
UC Berkeley School of Law, J.D., Order of the Coif, 2014; Duke University, B.S.E., 2009. I am 
extremely grateful to the talented editors and staff of the Oklahoma Law Review for their diligent 
hard work. I would also like to give a warm shout out to my parents for all their support throughout 
the years. And to everyone who dreams of Outer Space, thank you for sharing this universe with 
me. 
 1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165 (1803). 
 2. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1207–08 (2006). 
 3. See Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Important (and Best) Supreme Court 
Opinions and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407, 423 n.73 (2010) (stating that Marbury has been cited 
“over 17,000” times—the “fourth most citations of any case in Supreme Court history”).  
 4. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174–75 (noting that the Supreme Court has original 
jurisdiction for only certain types of cases). 
 5. Elliott v. Piersol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 329 (1828). 
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international territories are often the subject of intense litigation.
6
 However, with 
globalization only increasing, many legal professionals, scholars, and politicians 
have attempted to develop comprehensive legal regimes that can efficiently and 
effectively resolve these multinational disputes.
7
 While the rise of many different 
types of rules and regulations can cause confusion and complexity, it is still a 
well-developed area of international law; experienced and astute legal 




Yet, there is a vast and uncharted international territory where jurisdictional 
laws still remain largely unsettled: Outer Space. A mechanism for determining 
governing authority has not been a pressing concern in this sector—Outer Space 
has generally been the exclusive realm of governmental agencies. In fact, through 
early 2021, only three countries have crewed launch capabilities.
9
 But, a tectonic 
shift has recently been underway as Outer Space is rapidly being transformed into 
a new playground for commercial activities.
10
 With this territory becoming 
packed with satellites and spacecrafts originating from more nations and 
companies than ever before,
11
 major disputes are likely unavoidable. To wit, in 
the summer of 2019, the New York Times reported the first ever accusation of 
                                                                                                             
 6. Hélène van Lith, International Jurisdiction and Commercial Litigation: Uniform Rules for 
Contract Disputes 4 (June 19, 2009) (Ph.D. dissertation, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam) (T.M.C. 
Asser Press), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/18507043.pdf.  
 7. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution 
Regimes in International Trade Organizations, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 697, 702 (1999) (“These 
events have spurred and accompanied the evolution of a variety of different dispute resolution 
regimes.”). 
 8. Id. (noting that common themes exist in different international dispute resolution regimes). 
 9. See Sam McNeil, China Prepping for Mission to Bring Back Material from Moon, 
PHYS.ORG (Nov. 23, 2020), https://phys.org/news/2020-11-china-latest-lunar-mission.html 
(observing that only the United States, Russia, and China have crewed launch capabilities). 
 10. See Michael Sheetz, An Investor’s Guide to Space, Wall Street’s Next Trillion-Dollar 
Industry, CNBC (Dec. 13, 2019, 11:33 AM EST), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/09/how-to-
invest-in-space-companies-complete-guide-to-rockets-satellites-and-more.html (indicating that Outer 
Space “will become a multitrillion-dollar economy in the next 10 to 20 years”); see also Michael 
Sheetz, The Most Expensive Hotel Ever? Here’s the Cost for a Night at the International Space 
Station in 2020, CNBC (Nov. 14, 2019, 7:29 PM EST), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/07/nasa-
opening-iss-to-business-including-private-astronauts-by-2020.html (noting that the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration will open up the International Space Station for space 
tourism). 
 11. See Michael Sheetz & Magdalena Petrova, Why in the Next Decade Companies Will 
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criminal activity in Outer Space after astronaut Anne McClain allegedly illegally 
accessed her spouse’s bank account onboard the International Space Station.
12
 
While Ms. McClain was eventually cleared of all wrongdoing,
13
 this dispute 
raised a novel issue related to jurisdictional power: which country should have the 
right to investigate and resolve a particular conflict in Outer Space?
14
 While the 
jurisdictional authority for this particular controversy is fairly straightforward,
15
 
for future disputes in Outer Space, the answer might be less clear cut. Hence, a 
renewed focus on establishing a flexible framework to determine jurisdictional 
authority is more relevant than ever before. 
Yet, before this jurisdictional framework can be established, there is an even 
more fundamental question that needs to be addressed: where does Outer Space 
begin? Although certain countries have officially recognized an altitude of 100 
kilometers above mean sea level as the beginning of Outer Space, there is no 
universally accepted boundary.
16
 While there have been numerous undertakings to 
create such an Outer Space border, “a lack of political will to negotiate and agree 
on a boundary at the international level” has stymied any effort.
17
 But, Outer 
Space is becoming increasingly crowded; thus, this status quo is becoming 
increasingly untenable, and a firm demarcation is needed. 
To contribute to these areas of unsettled law, this Article proposes a new 
boundary for Outer Space and constructs a decision-tree framework for 
determining jurisdictional authority in this environment. Part I provides an 
overview of the major international treaties governing activities in Outer Space 
and a discussion of their relevant sections related to jurisdictional laws. Part II 
                                                                                                             
 12. Mike Baker, NASA Astronaut Anne McClain Accused by Spouse of Crime in Space, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/23/us/nasa-astronaut-anne-
mcclain.html [hereinafter Baker, Crime in Space]. 
 13. Mike Baker, Space Crime Allegation Leads to Charges Against Astronaut’s Ex-Wife, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/space-crime-allegation-
indictment.html. 
 14. Baker, Crime in Space, supra note 12.  
 15. See Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member States of the 
European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and 
the Government of the United States of America Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International 
Space Station, art. 22, Jan. 29, 1998, State Dep’t No. 01-52, 2001 WL 679938 (“[A country] may 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over personnel in or on any flight element who are their respective 
nationals.”). 
 16. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm., 56th Session, Matters 
Relating to the Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space: Replies of the International Institute of 
Space Law (IISL), at 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2017/CRP.29 (Apr. 4, 2017) [hereinafter IISL 
Replies].  
 17. Id.  
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outlines the current perspectives on the demarcation for Outer Space and 
proposes a new boundary that can garner international support. Part III lays out a 
framework that can determine which authority should have jurisdiction over a 
specific dispute. Part IV battle tests such jurisdictional decision tree by walking 
several hypothetical incidents through the analysis. With these proposals, this 
Article aims to spur action that will strengthen the legal foundation that governs 
Outer Space activities. Hopefully, these clarities in the law will help to unleash a 
new golden era of exploration leading to more innovations in humanity’s final 
frontier. 
I. Background: Treaties Governing Activities in Outer Space 
Since Sputnik 1’s fateful launch on October 4, 1957,
18
 human activities in 
Outer Space have continued unabatedly. As this environment became crowded 
with both unmanned satellites and manned capsules, the international community 
recognized the need for a basic legal framework to govern such activities—
thereby guaranteeing the availability of Outer Space for all nations. Attempting to 
achieve this goal, five major international agreements were drafted. They are 
commonly referred to as the “five United Nations treaties on outer space”
19
 and 
have laid the seminal foundation for doctrinal law in this sector. Therefore, it is 
helpful to provide an overview on these treaties before proposing a demarcation 
line for Outer Space and a jurisdictional framework for this territory. In 
chronological order, the five treaties are:  
1. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies,
20
 commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty of 
1967; 
2. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts 
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
21
 commonly 
known as the Rescue Agreement of 1968; 
                                                                                                             
 18. Mark Wade, Sputnik 1, ENCYCLOPEDIA ASTRONAUTICA, http://www.astronautix. 
com/s/sputnik1.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
 19. Space Law Treaties and Principles, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., 
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
 20. opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 21. opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement]. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/4
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3. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects,
22
 commonly known as the Space Liability Convention of 
1972; 
4. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space,
23
 commonly known as the Registration Convention of 1975; 
and  
5. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies,
24
 commonly known as the Moon Treaty of 
1979. 
Of these five treaties, four have been ratified—all except for the Moon Treaty 
of 1979. But all five agreements have significantly contributed to the 
establishment of a broad legal structure governing Outer Space activities. 
A. Outer Space Treaty of 1967 
The Outer Space Treaty is the sine qua non foundation of Outer Space legal 
doctrine.
25
 This treaty was negotiated primarily between the United States and the 
Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. While these two leading nations of 
the time were on the opposite sides of the first Space Race, both had recognized 
the dangers and catastrophic effects of a potential war in Outer Space.
26
 Hence, 
the treaty was drafted with the primary goal of ensuring that only peaceful 
activities shall take place in Outer Space.
27
 This enables the environment to “be 
free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind” and 
grants “free access to all areas of celestial bodies.”
28
 While the premise has led to 
                                                                                                             
 22. opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter Space Liability 
Convention]. 
 23. opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695 [hereinafter Registration Convention]. 
 24. opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 22 [hereinafter Moon Treaty]. 
 25. Loren Grush, How an International Treaty Signed 50 Years Ago Became the Backbone 
for Space Law, THE VERGE (Jan. 27, 2017, 11:14 AM EST), 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/27/14398492/outer-space-treaty-50-anniversary-exploration-
guidelines [hereinafter Grush, Backbone for Space Law]. 
 26. See id. (“Both the US and the Soviet Union wanted to prevent the expansion of the nuclear 
arms race into a completely new territory.”). 
 27. Christopher D. Johnson, Insight - 2017 and the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Outer Space 
Treaty, SECURE WORLD FOUND. (Jan. 16, 2017), https://swfound.org/news/all-
news/2017/01/insight-2017-and-the-fiftieth-anniversary-of-the-outer-space-treaty. 
 28. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, art. I. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
716 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:711 
 
 
controversies related to ownership rights—especially on Outer Space mining
29
—
it has guaranteed that all nations can freely explore and access Outer Space.  
Although written more than fifty years ago, the Outer Space Treaty was 
visionary for its time and is still remarkably relevant today. For instance, during 
the negotiations, the parties grappled with the topic of private commercial 
activities in Outer Space. The Soviet Union originally wanted to limit activities in 
Outer Space to those of national governments only.
30
 But the United States 
wanted to retain the ability for private enterprises to develop and flourish in 
Outer Space.
31
 Ultimately, a compromise was reached in which private 
commercial activities were allowed in Outer Space but only if they are first 
authorized by a State party who will be liable for such activities.
32
 By enabling 
commercial corporations to participate, this framework paved the way for the 
success of private parties, such as Space Exploration Technologies 
Corporation—better known as “SpaceX”—today.
33
 
While the treaty dictates that Outer Space “is not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any 
other means,”
34
 it has certain provisions related to jurisdictional authority. Article 
VIII of the Outer Space Treaty indicates that a nation “on whose registry an 
object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control 
over such object, and over any personnel thereof.”
35
 The treaty further 
emphasizes that ownership over an object is “not affected by [its] presence in 
outer space or on a celestial body or by [its] return to the Earth.”
36
 Therefore, like 
                                                                                                             
 29. Alex S. Li, Mining for the Future, #THESPACEBAR (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://alexsli.com/thespacebar/2017/10/24/mining-for-the-future. 
 30. See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 
Draft Declaration of the Basic Principles Governing the Activities of States Pertaining to the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.2 (Sept. 10, 1962) (“All activities 
of any kind pertaining to the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out solely and 
exclusively by States . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 31. Christopher D. Johnson, The Outer Space Treaty at 50, SPACE REV. (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3155/1. 
 32. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, art. VI. 
 33. See Alex S. Li, Made in America: The Maiden Flight of NASA’s Commercial Crew, 
#THESPACEBAR (May 30, 2020), https://alexsli.com/thespacebar/2020/5/26/made-in-america-the-
maiden-flight-of-the-commercial-crew (noting SpaceX became “(1) the first commercial entity with 
manned capabilities to Outer Space and (2) the first crewed launch provider for a national space 
agency”). 
 34. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, art. II. 
 35. Id. art. VIII. 
 36. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/4
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a ship at sea, the nation under which the space-faring object is flagged shall retain 
jurisdiction over all activities for such object. 
The Outer Space Treaty officially opened for signatures on January 27, 1967, 
and entered into force on October 10, 1967.
37
 As of May 18, 2021, 110 countries 
are parties to the Outer Space Treaty, while another twenty-three countries have 
signed but not ratified the treaty.
38
 Developed at a time when space-related 
activities were still in their infancy, the treaty is designed to be simple.
39
 Because 
of this characteristic, the Outer Space Treaty is susceptible to multiple 
interpretations which limit its practical use. However, as the first major 
international treaty on space, the Outer Space Treaty has served as the 
fundamental backbone for every piece of major space-related legislation passed in 
the last five and a half decades.  
B. Rescue Agreement of 1968 
The Rescue Agreement is the shortest of these five Outer Space treaties and is 
intended to further clarify Article V of the Outer Space Treaty.
40
 Under the 
Rescue Agreement, should a nation become aware of an object/crew in distress, 
that party would notify both the United Nations Secretary-General and the State 
that is responsible for such object/crew.
41
 Additionally, if such object/crew lands 
in an area under a country’s control or where a nation could assist, then such 




The Rescue Agreement has two interesting characteristics: one related to the 
definition for “launching authority” and the other related to the phrase 
“personnel of a spacecraft.” 
In Article VI, the Rescue Agreement includes “intergovernmental 
organization” as a part of the definition for a “launching authority.”
43
 As one of 
the first major international treaties that enables an “intergovernmental 
                                                                                                             
 37. U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELATING 
TO ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE AS AT 1 JANUARY 2020, at 1 (2020), https://www.unoosa.org/ 
documents/pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/TreatiesStatus-2020E.pdf [hereinafter U.N. TREATIES 
STATUS]. 
 38. Id. at 10. 
 39. Grush, Backbone for Space Law, supra note 25 (“The Outer Space Treaty was never 
intended to be comprehensive, though.”). 
 40. See Rescue Agreement, supra note 21, pmbl. (“Desiring to give further concrete 
expression to the rights and obligations contained in the [Outer Space Treaty] . . . .”). 
 41. Id. arts. I, V. 
 42. Id. arts. II–III, V. 
 43. Id. art. VI (emphasis added).  
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organization” to have the same level of authority as a national government,
44
 the 




Second, instead of using the term “astronaut[],” as listed in the Outer Space 
Treaty,
46
 all throughout its articles, the Rescue Agreement uses the term 
“personnel of a spacecraft” to describe the crew. The difference in terminology 
has led some to argue that this may be the drafters’ deliberate intent to indicate 
that the word “astronaut” should not be synonymous with the phrase “personnel 
of a spacecraft.”
47
 However, because the formal title to the Rescue Agreement 
contains the word “astronaut,” drafters might have written “personnel” so that 
the Agreement would apply to “astronauts”—a largely American-centric term, 
“cosmonauts”—a largely Russian-centric term, and any other “-onauts” term 
that might appear such as “taikonauts”—a Chinese-centric term.
48
 But, this word 
does beg the question of who is considered “personnel of a spacecraft.” Is the 
term specifically limited to “-onauts” and other professional flight participants, 
or would it include space tourists as well?
49
 
The Rescue Agreement officially opened for signatures on April 22, 1968, and 
entered into force on December 3, 1968.
50
 As of May 18, 2021, ninety-eight 
countries are parties to the Rescue Agreement and another twenty-three countries 
have signed the agreement.
51
 
                                                                                                             
 44. See Frans G. von der Dunk, A Sleeping Beauty Awakens: The 1968 Rescue Agreement 
After Forty Years, 34 J. SPACE L. 411, 421 (2008) (stating that the Rescue Agreement provided the 
“possibility for intergovernmental organizations to be equated to states under their respective 
regimes. In this respect, the Rescue Agreement was the first of its kind, not only in space law, but 
also from a broader perspective.”). 
 45. Cf. id. (“Opening up partisanship to treaties to an intergovernmental organisation on a 
formal (and more or less equal) level indeed remained confined initially to the space arena. Outside 
of space law, only the advent of the European Union in the last decade of the twentieth century as a 
supranational power caused partisanship of the individual EU member states to certain treaties to be 
partly emptied of meaning.”). 
 46. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, art. V (emphasis added) (“States Parties to the Treaty 
shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render to them all possible 
assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State 
Party or on the high seas.”). 
 47. von der Dunk, supra note 44, at 421–22 (emphases added).  
 48. Id. at 417, 421–22 (emphases added). 
 49. See Alex S. Li, Are Space Tourists Astronauts?, #THESPACEBAR, https://alexsli. 
com/thespacebar/2017/11/12/are-space-tourists-astronauts (last visited Feb. 26, 2021) (noting space 
tourists likely would not be able to designate themselves as “astronauts”). 
 50. U.N. TREATIES STATUS, supra note 37, at 1. 
 51. Id. at 10. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/4
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C. Space Liability Convention of 1972  
The Space Liability Convention expands on the liability regime introduced in 
Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty.
52
 While the document sets up two 
standards for liability, it dictates that claims can only be submitted by a national 
entity.
53
 If a private entity wishes to file a claim under the convention, then that 
entity will need to petition its government to make a claim on its behalf.
54
 
Under the Space Liability Convention, depending on the location of the 
damage, there are two standards of liability: absolute liability and fault-based 
liability. If the damage is caused by a country’s object “on the surface of the 
Earth or to [an] aircraft in flight,” that nation is absolutely liable for any and all 
such damage.
55
 That State would even be responsible for damages caused by 
circumstances beyond its control in those locations. But, for damages caused by a 
country’s object anywhere else—such as in Outer Space—that sovereign is only 
liable for the damages of “its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is 
responsible.”
56
 So for damages that occur in Outer Space, causation will play a 
role in the determination of liability. Under both regimes, when more than one 




The Space Liability Convention also establishes a basic jurisdictional 
framework to resolve conflicts in Outer Space. Under the treaty, the parties will 
first attempt to resolve the dispute on their own.
58
 However, if no resolution is 
achieved after a certain amount of time, the convention provides for the 
establishment of a “Claims Commission at the request of either party.”
59
 The 
commission will be made up of three members—one appointed by each party and 
the chairperson jointly agreed to by the parties involved;
60
 if the parties cannot 
agree on the chairperson, then the United Nations Secretary-General will appoint 
this member.
61
 The Claims Commission will determine its administrative 
                                                                                                             
 52. See Space Liability Convention, supra note 22, pmbl. (“Recalling the [Outer Space Treaty] 
. . . [and] [r]ecognizing the need to elaborate effective international rules and procedures 
concerning liability . . . .”). 
 53. Id. art. II–III, VIII. 
 54. Id. art. VIII (allowing only state parties to present a claim). 
 55. Id. art. II. 
 56. Id. art. III. 
 57. Id. art. IV, ¶ 1. 
 58. Id. art. IX. 
 59. Id. art. XIV. 
 60. Id. art. XV, ¶ 1. 
 61. Id. art. XV, ¶ 2. 
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procedures and decide by majority vote.
62
 Hence, this “adjudication commission” 
can have complete jurisdictional authority over the dispute resolution process. 
As of May 18, 2021, only one claim has been made under the Space Liability 
Convention. In January 1978, a Soviet Union nuclear-powered satellite, Kosmos 
954, crash-landed in Canada.
63
 Because some of the debris fragments were still 
radioactive, the recovery and clean-up process proved costly.
64
 Since the debris 
caused damage “on the surface of the Earth,”
65
 pursuant to the Space Liability 
Convention, the Soviet Union would be absolutely liable for all costs associated 
with damages caused by Kosmos 954’s crash. For these reasons, Canada 
presented the Soviet Union with a claim of $6,041,174.70 Canadian dollars for 
Kosmos 954’s recovery and clean-up expenses.
66
 The Soviet Union eventually 
agreed to pay about three million Canadian dollars.
67
 
The Space Liability Convention officially opened for signatures on March 29, 
1972, and entered into force on September 1, 1972.
68
 As of May 18, 2021, 
ninety-eight countries are parties to the Space Liability Convention and another 
nineteen countries have signed the instrument.
69
 Although only one claim has 
been made under the Space Liability Convention,
70
 this treaty might become more 
relevant as defunct satellites and rocket parts increasingly obstruct Earth’s orbits. 
                                                                                                             
 62. Id. art. XVI, ¶¶ 3–5. 
 63. Timothy G. Nelson, Regulating the Void: In-Orbit Collisions and Space Debris, 40 J. 
SPACE L. 105, 105 (2015-2016). 
 64. See Alexander F. Cohen, Cosmos 954 and the International Law of Satellite Accidents, 
10 YALE J. INT’L L. 78, 80 (1984) (“The joint U.S.-Canadian cleanup operation that resulted from 
this exchange, dubbed ‘Operation Morning Light,’ cost Canada nearly C$14 million, while the U.S. 
spent some U.S. $2-2.5 million.”). 
 65. Space Liability Convention, supra note 22, art. II. 
 66. Robert Gillette, Soviets Ready to Discuss Liability Pact for Nuclear Mishaps: Moscow 
Won’t Compensate West for Chernobyl Damage but Will Consider Question for Future, L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 6, 1986, 12:00 AM PT), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-10-06-mn-
4518-story.html. 
 67. Cohen, supra note 64, at 80. 
 68. U.N. TREATIES STATUS, supra note 37, at 1. 
 69. Id. at 10. 
 70. Although only one claim has been made under the Space Liability Convention, several 
incidents could have led to claims under this treaty. See Alexander P. Reinert, Updating the 
Liability Regime in Outer Space: Why Spacefaring Companies Should Be Internationally Liable 
for Their Space Objects, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 325, 337–38 (2020) (noting that “numerous 
other incidents on Earth” and in Outer Space “could have invoked the Space Liability 
Convention”).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/4
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D. Registration Convention of 1975 
Like the Rescue Agreement and the Space Liability Convention, the 
Registration Convention also elaborates on principles introduced in the Outer 
Space Treaty.
71
 Specifically, the Registration Convention lays the foundation for 
a registration system to account for objects in space.
72
 
While a relatively straightforward treaty, this convention plays a critical role in 
giving teeth to and ensuring the success of other space-related treaties. For 
instance, the Registration Convention effectuates the Rescue Agreement.
73
 A 
party will not be able to fulfill its notification obligations if it becomes aware of 
an object in distress that is not properly identified;
74
 even if such country wants to 
help, it will not know whom to contact. The Registration Convention is also 
important for the implementation of the Space Liability Convention.
75
 Under the 
Space Liability Convention, liabilities for damages done by space-faring objects 
are appropriated among the nations involved in the incident.
76
 Therefore, this 
liability framework is also heavily dependent on the proper registration and 
identification of objects in Outer Space. 
The Registration Convention officially opened for signatures on January 14, 
1975, and entered into force on September 15, 1976.
77
 Perhaps because of the 
potential for liabilities, many non-space-faring nations have not ratified the 
convention, and this treaty has one of the lowest ratification rates of these space-
related treaties.
78
 As of May 18, 2021, seventy countries are parties to the 
Registration Convention and another three countries have signed the instrument.
79
 
                                                                                                             
 71. See Registration Convention, supra note 23, pmbl. (“Recalling that the [Outer Space 
Treaty] . . . refers to the State on whose registry an object launched into outer space is 
carried . . . .”).  
 72. See id. (“Believing that a mandatory system of registering objects launched into outer 
space would, in particular, assist in their identification and would contribute to the application and 
development of international law . . . .”). 
 73. See id. (“Recalling also that the [Rescue Agreement] provides that a launching authority 
shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to the return of an object it has launched into outer 
space . . . .”).  
 74. See Rescue Agreement, supra note 21, art. I.  
 75. See Registration Convention, supra note 23, pmbl. (“Recalling further that the [Liability 
Convention] establishes international rules and procedures concerning the liability of launching 
States for damage caused by their space objects . . .”).  
 76. Space Liability Convention, supra note 22, art. IV, ¶ 1. 
 77. U.N. TREATIES STATUS, supra note 37, at 2. 
 78. Id. at 10. 
 79. Id. 
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E. Moon Treaty of 1979 
Although a part of the five major United Nation treaties related to Outer 
Space, the Moon Treaty is regarded as a failed agreement because of its lack of 
acceptance among space-faring nations.
80
 
The Moon Treaty further elaborates on concepts introduced in the Outer Space 
Treaty by focusing specifically on the Moon and other celestial bodies in the 
Solar System.
81
 It attempts to lay a foundation for claiming and appropriating 
resources on the Moon by borrowing the “Enterprise” concept
82
 from the Law of 
the Sea—specifically, the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982.
83
 
Central to this system, the Moon Treaty declares that “[t]he Moon and its natural 
resources are the common heritage of mankind . . . [and] is not subject to national 
appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by 
any other means.”
84
 Similar to the application of the “Enterprise” system to 
oceanic resources, this treaty notes that the natural resources of the Moon are 
entitled to “equitable sharing by all State Parties in the benefits derived from 
those resources.”
85
 Hence, even if one country “dug up” these resources, that 
nation would not have complete and exclusive ownership and control over such 
resources.  
Furthermore, the Moon Treaty also forbids any individuals, entities, or 
governments from owning any “surface or the subsurface of the moon or any 
areas thereof.”
86
 This is a controversial proposition as it raises important property 
questions related to both Outer Space mining
87
 and ownership rights on celestial 
bodies such as Mars.
88
 
                                                                                                             
 80. Michael Listner, The Moon Treaty: Failed International Law or Waiting in the 
Shadows?, SPACE REV. (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/1954/1. 
 81. Moon Treaty, supra note 24, pmbl.  
 82. See Listner, supra note 80 (“[I]t is probable that it would be similar in form to the 
international regime called ‘The Enterprise’ . . . .”). “The Enterprise” describes an arrangement 
where developed nations and private companies allocate a portion of the resources that they collect 
to an international regime (the Enterprise), which then distributes those resources among 
developing nations. Id. 
 83. Nov. 16, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3.  
 84. Moon Treaty, supra note 24, art. XI, ¶¶ 1–2.  
 85. Id. art. XI, ¶ 7(d). 
 86. Id. art. XI, ¶ 3. 
 87. See Li, supra note 29. 
 88. See Alex S. Li & Sean McCormick, Can People Stake Claims on Mars?, #THESPACEBAR 
(July 30, 2017), https://alexsli.com/thespacebar/2017/7/30/can-people-stake-claims-on-mars. 
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The Moon Treaty officially opened for signatures on December 18, 1979, and 
entered into force on July 11, 1984.
89
 But, because most space-faring nations 
(including the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and several members of the 
European Space Agency) have not ratified, signed, or acceded to the Moon 
Treaty, the agreement does not have widespread practical effect. As of May 18, 
2021, only eighteen countries are parties to the Moon Treaty and another four 
countries have signed the instrument.
90
 
While Outer Space law is still very much in its infancy, these five United 
Nations treaties will always serve as the earliest international legal guideposts for 
this territory. However, the boundary for Outer Space—and when these treaties 
become applicable—remains fluid to this day. The next section will shed light on 
this uncertainty and propose a new solution for this demarcation problem. 
II. Where Does Outer Space Begin? 
The first step in determining the jurisdictional authority for a space-based 
incident is to verify such conflict actually took place in “Outer Space.” Although 
this seems like a trivial matter, there is no official or universally accepted 
boundary for Outer Space.
91
 What appears to be a strange omission has a simple 
geopolitical reason: access to airspace. For countries with air supremacy, not 
having a definitive Outer Space border is immensely useful. Without an 
internationally recognized line for the beginning of Outer Space, these nations 
would have unfettered access to the air space above any foreign country as long 
as their planes are flying “high enough.” The lack of a clear boundary provides 




Hence, the United States, with air superiority second to none,
93
 has strenuously 
rejected all efforts to create a firm demarcation line for Outer Space. Its rationale 
                                                                                                             
 89. U.N. TREATIES STATUS, supra note 37, at 2. 
 90. Id. at 10. 
 91. IISL Replies, supra note 16, at 1. 
 92. See Loren Grush, Why Defining the Boundary of Space May Be Crucial for the Future of 
Spaceflight: It Could Change How We Regulate Vehicles in the Sky, THE VERGE (Dec. 13, 2018, 
2:43 PM EST), https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/13/18130973/space-karman-line-definition-
boundary-atmosphere-astronauts [hereinafter Grush, Future of Spaceflight] (“If there is an 
internationally agreed upon solid line for where space begins, then other countries could cry foul if 
the U.S. flies at a super-high altitude above a foreign territory, but below the space line.”). 
 93. See Tom O’Connor, How Does Russia’s Air Force Compare to America’s?, NEWSWEEK 
(Apr. 28, 2018, 6:00 AM EDT), https://www.newsweek.com/how-does-russia-air-force-compare-
us-904377a (“The U.S. commands by far the largest airfleet in the world . . . .”). 
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“continues to be that defining or delimiting outer space is not necessary. No legal 
or practical problems have arisen in the absence of such a definition.”
94
 Without a 
boundary, it is hard for any country to block a foreign nation’s overhead flights 
because no one can definitely prove where “high enough” starts. But, the basic 
tenet behind this intentional omission might be falling apart in this new space 
age. As more and more commercial entities develop the capability to reach 
altitudes that were once reserved to government entities, the need for a boundary 
grows. Without a line defining where Outer Space begins, uncertainties related to 
jurisdiction, policy, and liability could cause legal headaches and impede further 
progress in Outer Space. 
This Part begins by summarizing the leading positions on the boundary for 
Outer Space. Using an amalgamation of these perspectives, this Part will 
continue by introducing a hybrid solution for a demarcation line. This proposal 
would set the Outer Space border at an altitude of eighty kilometers above mean 
sea level and would also establish a “Transitionary Outer Space Zone” between 
eighty and 100 kilometers.
95
 Helping to address geopolitical concerns, this 
Transitionary Outer Space Zone (“TOS Zone”) shall be modeled after the 
“Exclusive Economic Zone” from the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea.
96
 In the TOS Zone, all countries will have the freedom to operate 
as long as their activities do not impede on the territorial integrity of the nation 
below such zone. 
A. The Three Leading Perspectives on the Boundary for Outer Space 
There are three boundaries for Outer Space that have garnered support within 
the space community: (1) the Kármán Line, (2) the Astronaut Badge Line, and (3) 
the Mission Intent Line. 
1. The Kármán Line 
With the need for a firm demarcation line growing, the first candidate that 
many look to is the Kármán Line. Located at 100 kilometers (about sixty-two 
miles) above mean sea level, this line is named after the Hungarian-American 
                                                                                                             
 94. Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space and the Character and Utilization of the 
Geostationary Orbit: Statement by the Delegation of the United States of America, Legal Subcomm. 
of the U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Apr. 2001), https://2009-
2017.state.gov/s/l/22718.htm [hereinafter Delimitation of Outer Space]. 
 95. See infra note 120. 
 96. opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.C. 3 [hereinafter Law of the Sea]. 
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engineer and physicist Theodore von Kármán.
97
 Currently, this is the official 
boundary for the beginning of Outer Space used by the World Air Sports 
Federation—officially the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (FAI).
98
 Since 
the FAI is the record-keeper of various world records for aerospace and 
spaceflight activities,
99
 the Kármán Line is the unofficial gold standard of Outer 
Space borders. 
Through his aerospace research, von Kármán discovered that at a certain 
altitude, the atmosphere becomes so thin that the speed needed—the forward 
thrust—to keep the object in the air is close to or faster than the orbital speed at 
that altitude.
100
 At that level, centrifugal forces would take over and the object 
could stay in the air simply due to free fall rather than forward thrust.
101
 In other 
words, at this altitude, orbital mechanics (e.g., free fall) is more important than 
aerodynamic operations (e.g., lift). 
Von Kármán calculated this altitude to be 83.8 kilometers (about fifty-two 
miles above mean sea level).
102
 While von Kármán was not trying to define the 
boundary of Outer Space via his research, the result was eventually adapted for 
this use.
103
 Instead of an exact altitude of 83.8 kilometers, von Kármán and FAI 
agreed to use the easier to remember and more round number of 100 kilometers 
as the start of Outer Space.
104
 Thus, the 100 kilometers “Kármán Line” was born. 
While the use of the Kármán Line as the boundary for Outer Space has broad 
support, it is not universally adopted.
105
 Detractors have rejected this border for a 
variety of reasons. Some note that the revision upward to 100 kilometers would 
neglect the scientific evidence (and von Kármán’s own calculations) that aircraft 
                                                                                                             
 97. S. Sanz Fernández de Córdoba, 100KM Altitude Boundary for Astronautics, FAI 
ASTRONAUTIC RECS. COMM’N (June 21, 2004), https://www.fai.org/page/icare-boundary. 
 98. See FÉDÉRATION AÉRONAUTIQUE INTERNATIONALE, FAI SPORTING CODE: SECTION 8–
ASTRONAUTICS 6 (Apr. 17, 2009), https://naa.aero/userfiles/files/documents/Downloads/Sporting 
%20Code%20Section%208%20Edition%202009.pdf ( “All flights must exceed an altitude of 100 
km in order to qualify for [Outer Space] records.”). 
 99. See Córdoba, supra note 97. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Grush, Future of Spaceflight, supra note 92. 
 103. Córdoba, supra note 97. 
 104. See Grush, Future of Spaceflight, supra note 92 (“Around 1960, the FAI decided to set the 
limit at 100 kilometers . . . .”); see also Córdoba, supra note 97 (“It was apparently Von Karman 
himself who realised, and proposed to the rest, the very round number of 100 Km (very close to the 
calculated number). The rest of the people eagerly accepted it.”). 
 105. Jonathan C. McDowell, The Edge of Space: Revisiting the Karman Line, 151 ACTA 
ASTRONAUTICA 668, 668 (2018). 
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loses aerodynamic control at an altitude much lower.
106
 Others argue that 
technological advancements will eventually render this focus on empirical 
characteristics myopic.
107
 With criticism abound, several alternative demarcation 
lines have gained traction. 
2. The Astronaut Badge Line 
Recently, the FAI announced that it is looking into whether to change its 
boundary for Outer Space.
108
 One replacement candidate that the organization has 




This altitude has some indirect support, especially coming out of the United 
States. This Article refers to this fifty-mile line as the “Astronaut Badge Line” 
because it represents the threshold for the United States Air Force to award the 
astronaut badge
110
—both the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) appear to do the 
same.
111
 By awarding individuals with this stamp of approval, these agencies are 
implicitly demonstrating their support for the concept that activities past the 
Astronaut Badge Line are space-related. With the United States a major player in 
Outer Space, this inferential endorsement—albeit not its official position
112
—
                                                                                                             
 106. See Timothy G. Nelson, Where Does Space Begin? The Decades-Long Legal Mission to 
Find the Border Between Air and Space, SPACENEWS (Mar. 26, 2019), https://spacenews.com/op-
ed-where-does-space-begin-the-decades-long-legal-mission-to-find-the-border-between-air-and-
space (“[T]he U.S. Air Force awards astronaut wings to any pilot who has gone above 80 
kilometers, apparently on the basis that aircraft that fly above that altitude . . . have no aerodynamic 
control.”). 
 107. See id. (“Even if the line is fixed at a given distance such as 100 kilometers, technological 
advances may render that border unsound.”); see also Delimitation of Outer Space, supra note 94 
(“It would be dangerous . . . to agree to an artificial line between air space and outer space, when it 
cannot predict the consequences of such a line.”).  
 108. Statement About the Karman Line, FÉDÉRATION AÉRONAUTIQUE INTERNATIONALE (Nov. 
30, 2018), https://www.fai.org/news/statement-about-karman-line. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See DEP’T OF THE AIRFORCE, AVIATION AND PARACHUTIST SERVICE, AERONAUTICAL 
RATINGS, AND AVIATION BADGES 22 (Aug. 17, 2016) (providing that an officer “qualified to 
perform duties in space (50 miles above the earth’s surface) who completes a minimum of one 
operational mission is eligible for the astronaut qualifier”). 
 111. See Grush, Future of Spaceflight, supra note 92 (“NASA does the same. And while the 
Federal Aviation Administration does not have an official definition, it usually gives out astronaut 
badges to those who have gone above 50 miles.”). 
 112. Delimitation of Outer Space, supra note 94 (“[The United States’] position continues to be 
that defining or delimiting outer space is not necessary.”).  
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should carry some weight. Hence, making the Astronaut Badge Line the official 
boundary for Outer Space has a strong foundation. 
Additionally, there is scientific support for this line as the demarcation for 
Outer Space. As discussed earlier,
113
 von Kármán found that orbital mechanics 
become more important than aerodynamic forces in keeping an object in the air at 
about an altitude of 83.8 kilometers (or fifty-two miles).
114
 Thus, the Astronaut 
Badge Line at eighty kilometers/fifty miles is a much more accurate 
approximation to this altitude than the current 100 kilometers measurement for 
the Kármán Line. Therefore, if the reason behind the FAI’s current demarcation is 
based on von Kármán’s scientific discoveries, then the boundary should be drawn 
at a level that stays truer to von Kármán’s research.  
But, the Astronaut Badge Line is still not recognized as the official Outer 
Space border by any country. Even while the United States awards astronaut 
badges for individuals passing the fifty-mile altitude threshold, it still does not 
support a demarcation line for Outer Space.
115
 The United States’ resistance here 
is likely the result of its air supremacy.
116
 With commercial entities now having 
the ability to traverse the Astronaut Badge Line,
117
 entering “Outer Space” is 
more accessible than ever before. Similar to how air travel became available to 
the masses,
118
 the democratization of Outer Space is likely inevitable. While this 
development is a net positive, the increasing ease in crossing the Astronaut Badge 
Line will make its official adoption as the Outer Space border difficult. Countries 
with air supremacy would worry the line could negate their technological 
advantage and broaden the exclusive club of sovereigns that can perform 
“spaceflights” over another State’s territory. Likewise, countries without 
                                                                                                             
 113. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 114. THOMAS GANGALE, HOW HIGH THE SKY?: THE DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF OUTER 
SPACE AND TERRITORIAL AIRSPACE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (2018). 
 115. Delimitation of Outer Space, supra note 94 (“[The United States’] position continues to be 
that defining or delimiting outer space is not necessary.”).  
 116. Grush, Future of Spaceflight, supra note 92. 
 117. See Loren Grush, With Shiny New Badges, Virgin Galactic Pilots Join Elite Group of 
Commercial Astronauts, THE VERGE (Feb. 8, 2019, 10:29 AM EST), https://www.theverge.com/ 
2019/2/8/18216268/virgin-galactic-pilots-forger-stucky-cj-sturckow-faa-commercial-astronaut-
wings (“[B]y crossing an altitude of 50 miles in a commercial vehicle, the two had qualified for the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s commercial astronaut wings.”). 
 118. See The Era of Mass Air Travel Begins, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L AIR & SPACE MUSEUM, 
https://airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/america-by-air/online/heyday/heyday11.cfm (last visitedMay 
2, 2021) (“With the steady increase in passenger traffic, the level of personal service decreased. The 
stresses of air travel began to replace the thrill. Flying was no longer a novelty or an adventure; it 
was becoming a necessity.”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
728 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:711 
 
 
advanced air capabilities would argue the line is too low to effectively halt 
overhead surveillance flights by other nations. Hence, the lack of geopolitical 
support would likely make the universal acceptance of the Astronaut Badge Line 
extremely difficult, if not dead on arrival.  
3. The Mission Intent Line 
Finally, a perspective envisioned by Thomas Gangale that has garnered 
interest recently is to define Outer Space by the intention of the object rather than 
by an altitude. Under what this Article calls the “Mission Intent Line,” Gangale 
argues that it is the planned destination of the airborne object that should define 
its classification as a spacecraft or aircraft.
119
 
Under this test, even if the object does not reach Outer Space, it would still be 
classified as a spacecraft if it intended to travel to Outer Space. Hence, if such a 
launch were to fail, the resulting legal liabilities would be determined through 
space-related rules and regulations rather than the ones governing airplane 
operations.  
However, by making the test subjective and based on the intention of the 
object, this perspective literally blurs the line. This will introduce additional 
ambiguities. For instance, it could lead to individuals abusing the system by 
outwardly stating intentions of reaching Outer Space even if that is not their 
actual goal. When the legal system turns strictly on perceived subjective intent, 
entities are incentivized to choose the legal regime most favorable for them. This 
also creates a policing problem: other than clear-cut cases, no one can ever prove 
with certainty whether an object is meant to be a spacecraft or an aircraft. 
B. A Demarcation Proposal that Considers Objectivity and Subjectivity 
As the discussion reveals, the three leading perspectives on the boundary for 
Outer Space are either derived solely on objective factors (the Kármán Line and 
the Astronaut Badge Line) or subjective factors (the Mission Intent Line). 
However, a better solution might be found in a blended option that balances the 
need for a distinct physical marker but also considers the intent of an object. In 
this section, this Article introduces a proposal that balances objectivity and 
subjectivity by setting the Outer Space border at an altitude of eighty kilometers 
above mean sea level and creating a “Transitionary Outer Space Zone” (“TOS 
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First, an altitude of eighty kilometers above mean sea level should be used as 
the demarcation for Outer Space. This altitude would align with current objective 
scientific evidence demonstrating that, close to this altitude, the astronautic 
principle of orbital velocity becomes more important than the aeronautical 
concept of lift for an object to stay in flight.
121
 Since Outer Space travel considers 
principles of gravitational forces (e.g., planning a free-return trajectory from the 
Moon or using the Hohmann transfer orbit) rather than atmospheric factors, this 
makes the eighty kilometers line the perfect transition level; an object must be in 
the realm of Outer Space once it is no longer primarily at the whim of any 
planetary factors. Since this scientific boundary had been calculated through 
approximation, rounding it to eighty kilometers would make this line far more 
precise than the 100 kilometers line currently supported by some. 
However, this eighty kilometers boundary will only achieve universal 
acceptance if it overcomes the geopolitical challenges that have historically 
hindered global acceptance of a demarcation line. A twenty kilometers TOS Zone 
between the altitudes of eighty kilometers to 100 kilometers above mean sea level 
can do just this.
122
 Any foreign nation’s space-faring object would have 
permissible passage in another nation’s TOS Zone as long as the intent of such 
nation’s object falls within certain lawful activities.  
The TOS Zone would operate very similarly to the “Exclusive Economic 
Zone” introduced in the Law of the Sea.
123
 In an Exclusive Economic Zone, the 
adjacent state would have exclusive “sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources [of such 
zone]. . . .”
124
 However, other nations would still enjoy in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone, “the freedoms . . . of navigation and overflight . . . and other internationally 
lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the 
operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines.”
125
 Hence, while 
                                                                                                             
 120. Recognizing the existing support for altitudes of eighty kilometers and 100 kilometers 
above mean sea level as the Outer Space border, this Article poses a height of twenty kilometers for 
the TOS Zone to bridge the gap between these two perspectives. However, as goals shift and 
technologies advance, the actual size of the TOS Zone can be shrunk or expanded. 
 121. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 122. See supra note 120.  
 123. See Law of the Sea, supra note 96. 
 124. Id. art. 56, ¶ 1(a). 
 125. Id. art. 58, ¶ 1. 
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the coastal state could claim the resources of such zone, it must allow other 
nations unimpeded access to this territory for lawful reasons. 
The TOS Zone would port the Exclusive Economic Zone into Outer Space. All 
spacecrafts would have the permissionless ability to traverse freely for certain 
lawful reasons in the TOS Zone. While any objects of the nation operating in its 
own TOS Zone would not be subject to restrictions, any foreign spacecrafts 
within another nation’s TOS Zone would be prohibited from loitering in such 
area. These activities could include:
126
 (1) aimlessly circling around and 
remaining in another nation’s TOS Zone without permission, (2) annoying or 
harassing a nation within its own TOS Zone, (3) interfering or impeding the 
activities of a nation in its own TOS Zone (when this occurs, such foreign 
nation’s objects must safely give way), or (4) building or operating any 
permanent hovering “spacebase” in another nation’s TOS Zone (when it becomes 
technologically feasible). 
By defining a certain set of allowable activities in the TOS Zone, this proposal 
should alleviate certain nations’ concerns that a bright-line boundary would 
restrict such nations’ abilities to operate with a certain level of impunity above 
other nations’ airspaces. At the same time, with a bright-line boundary 
accompanying the TOS Zone, the country below each TOS Zone can rest assured 
knowing that foreign nations do not have unfettered access in the sky above. This 
should provide enough legal air cover such that an Outer Space demarcation line 
at eighty kilometers above mean sea level can become readily acceptable to a 
supermajority of nations. With this foundation set, an authority determination 
framework for addressing conflicts in Outer Space can be more firmly applied. 
III. An Authority Determination Framework for Outer Space  
Because Outer Space is owned by no one and is a part of humanity’s common 
heritage,
127
 an important question arises: who has the authority to investigate and 
resolve disputes in this sector? Typically, the nation that can assert sovereign 
domain over a territory would have full jurisdictional authority for that area, but 
this cannot be directly applied to Outer Space. But, because nations can claim 
ownership over particular objects in Outer Space, jurisdictional authority can turn 
on a conflict’s specific facts and circumstances. Hence, this Part will construct a 
                                                                                                             
 126. Flexibility and adaptability are at the heart of this solution. As technologies advance and 
global policies change, the type of activities that would be permitted, restricted, or prohibited in the 
TOS Zone can change with the times. 
 127. See supra Section I.A.  
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framework that can be used to determine the appropriate jurisdictional authority 


























Figure One: A Decision Tree Analysis for Determining Jurisdiction Authority 
 
While each step will be explained in depth, at its core, the framework relies on 
answering the following questions: 
$ Did the dispute occur in Outer Space? 
$ Did the dispute occur within a space-faring object or among multiple 
space-faring objects? 
$ If the dispute involves multiple objects: are they all flagged under one 
nation? 
$ If the dispute occurred in a space-faring object: how is such object 
flagged? 
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$ If the space-faring object is flagged under a collective of nations: is 
there a governing agreement among these nations? 
$ If there is no governing agreement: did the dispute take place in 
segment(s) of the space-faring object flagged under one particular 
nation? 
A. Step One: Did the Incident Take Place in Outer Space? 
In order to determine the appropriate jurisdictional authority, the first question 
that must be addressed is whether the conflict took place in Outer Space. As there 
is no universally accepted definition for the beginning of Outer Space,
128
 this 
could be a tricky question for borderline cases. However, if the proposed 
framework in Section II.B is adopted worldwide, then a conflict would have taken 
place in Outer Space as long as damages occurred eighty kilometers above mean 
sea level.
129
 By corollary, this framework will not be used to determine the 
jurisdictional authority for resolving conflicts below eighty kilometers. For such 
an event, existing international frameworks would apply as the incident would 
have either taken place in an area under a nation’s control or in international areas 
where existing legal regimes, such as the Law of the Sea, would apply. 
B. Step Two: Did the Incident Take Place Inside a Space-Faring Object or 
Among Space-Faring Objects?  
Once it is established that the conflict took place in Outer Space, the next 
question to ask is whether (1) it was an accident involving multiple space-faring 
objects, or (2) the conflict occurred inside a space-faring object. 
1. Incidents Involving Multiple Space-Faring Objects 
If the incident involves multiple objects in Outer Space, then the question on 
jurisdictional authority would turn on whether all space-faring objects involved 
are flagged under (a) one nation or (b) several nations. 
a) One State-Party: That State’s Jurisdictional Laws Control 
As long as all of the objects involved in an incident are flagged under the same 
State, then that nation would have complete authority over the dispute resolution 
process. Since no other sovereignties’ space-faring objects are involved, then 
there is no international concern. It is worth noting that the jurisdictional 
authority here does not turn on the nationalities of the parties involved. Similar to 
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visiting another country on Earth, by boarding a foreign-flagged spacecraft, these 
participants give their tacit consent to submit to such nation’s authority within its 
territory (the spacecraft).  
b) Multiple State-Parties: Establishment of an Outer Space Adjudication 
Commission 
If the conflict involves space-faring objects flagged under different nations, the 
Space Liability Convention’s procedures in establishing a jurisdictional authority 
would apply.
130
 However, this Article would make one small modification so that 
the convention’s procedures can be applied seamlessly to conflicts involving an 
odd number of nations. Similar to the procedures for the treaty’s Claims 
Commission,
131
 after providing a certain amount of time for the parties to resolve 
the dispute on their own, this proposal calls for the establishment of an Outer 
Space Adjudication Commission. Each State involved will choose a Commission 
member and all parties will jointly pick the Commission’s chairperson. However, 
unlike the Space Liability Convention, if there are an odd number of nations 
involved such that the final membership of the Commission (including the 
chairperson) will be even, then this proposal mandates the selection of a vice 
chairperson as well. If the parties cannot agree on the chairperson (or chairs) after 
a certain amount of time, the United Nations Secretary-General will make the 
selection. By majority vote—which will always be possible now that the 
membership is always odd—the Adjudication Commission will determine its 
rules, procedures, and governing law for the conflict. 
2. Incidents Occurring in a Space-Faring Object 
If the conflict took place inside a space-faring object, the jurisdictional 
authority analysis then turns on whether this object is flagged under one nation or 
under a collective of nations. 
a) One State-Party: That State’s Jurisdictional Laws Control 
If the conflict takes place inside a space-faring object that is registered to a 
single nation, the jurisdictional question becomes simple to resolve. Under Article 
VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, the nation “on whose registry an object launched 
into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, 
and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body.”
132
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 132. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, art. VIII. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
734 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:711 
 
 
Hence for conflict resolution purposes, jurisdictional authority will lie with the 
nation who registered such object. 
b) Multiple State-Parties: Jointly-Executed Agreement or an Outer Space 
Adjudication Commission 
However, if the incident took place in a space-faring object that is flagged 
under a collective of nations, then the governing agreement for such object should 
be used as the starting point to determine jurisdiction. These joint-operation 
agreements will typically have a conflict-resolution clause stipulating the 
jurisdictional procedures for these cases.
133
 
For example, activities onboard the International Space Station are governed 
by a 1998 intergovernmental agreement.
134
 Article 5 of the agreement notes that, 
in accordance with the Outer Space Treaty, “each Partner shall retain jurisdiction 
and control over the elements it registers . . . and over personnel in or on the 
Space Station who are its nationals.”
135
 Additionally, the agreement also 
contemplates the procedures required for criminal jurisdiction.
136
 Therefore, this 
agreement clearly lays out the authority that should be empowered to resolve a 
particular incident onboard the space station—including the McClain case 
mentioned in the introduction.
137
 
But, in the unlikely event that there is no agreement in place or none of the 
provisions would cover the conflict in question, then further examination is 
needed. Here, the exact location where the incident took place must be identified. 
If the accident can be pinpointed to segment(s) owned by a specific nation, then 
this particular incident location can be treated as a separate space-faring object. 
Applying the earlier-stated rules,
138
 the nation who registered such object will be 
empowered to resolve the conflict. If it is unclear who owns the segment(s) and/or 
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the accident took place in segments owned by multiple nations, then the earlier-
stated rules on the creation of an adjudication commission can be used.
139
 
IV. Case Studies: Application of the Jurisdictional Authority Framework 
This Part uses several hypotheticals to help further clarify the jurisdictional 
framework established in Part III. All scenarios are presumed to have occurred in 
Outer Space, thereby bypassing the first step of the analysis. 
A. Hypothetical No. 1: A Conflict Onboard a Spaceship 
Situation: A conflict arises among passengers and crew of a spacecraft 
flagged under a single nation. People involved in this incident came from 
different countries, with some not having diplomatic relationships with others. 
Nobody onboard is a citizen of the nation the spacecraft is flagged under. 
Because the conflict took place in a spacecraft flagged under a specific nation, 
that nation should have complete jurisdictional authority over the conflict.
140
 
Citizenship of the people involved is a red herring and does not factor into this 
determination.
141
 It also does not matter whether the nations involved, due to their 
citizens, do not have diplomatic relationships with one another; by boarding the 
spacecraft, those citizens voluntarily submit to the carrier’s national rules.
142
 
B. Hypothetical No. 2: An Accident Onboard a Jointly-Operated Space 
Station 
Situation: An accident involving crew members of different nationalities 
occurs on a segment of a large space station that is jointly operated by several 
nations. 
Since the space station is jointly operated by several nations, the first task is to 
determine whether there is an underlying governing agreement that addresses the 
issue at hand.
143
 If there is no agreement or if the agreement does not address this 
specific scenario, then the identity of the nation who registered the segment(s) 
involved in the accident should be determined.
144
 If the accident can be reduced to 
segment(s) owned by one specific nation, then that nation would have 
                                                                                                             
 139. See supra Section III.B.1.b. 
 140. See supra Section III.B.2.a. 
 141. See supra Section III.B.2.a. 
 142. See supra Section III.B.1.a. 
 143. See supra Section III.B.2.b. 
 144. See supra Section I.D. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
736 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:711 
 
 
jurisdictional authority over the conflict.
145
 If not, then an adjudication 
commission should be established to resolve the issue.
146
 
C. Hypothetical No. 3: An Incident Involving Two Individuals on a 
Spacewalk 
Situation: While outside on a spacewalk, frustration between two 
individuals boils over and leads to physical injuries. 
Because of the spacesuit, each individual could be considered as operating 
within a separate space-faring object flagged under that individual’s country.
147
 If 
both parties have the same nationality, then that State would have complete 
jurisdictional authority to resolve the conflict.
148
 However, if the two individuals 
are citizens of different countries, then an adjudication commission should be 
formed with three members: one member selected by each individual’s nation, 
and a chairperson jointly agreed to by both countries (or appointed by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations if an agreement cannot be reached).
149
 
All jurisdictional authority shall vest in such commission.
150
 
D. Hypothetical No. 4: Three Objects Colliding in Outer Space 
Situation: Two satellites, each from a separate nation, collide in Outer 
Space, leading to damages to both. One of these damaged satellites veers off 
course and bumps into a third State’s satellite, leading to additional damages. 
Here, an adjudication commission should be formed with five members.
151
 
Each of the three countries involved will individually nominate a member and 
then jointly select a chairperson and vice-chairperson—making the membership 
odd.
152
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Once the exclusive realm of governmental agencies, Outer Space is now 
attracting both established commercial entities and new innovative start-ups. 
These are the harbingers of the new Space Age. But in this latest era, the infusion 
of such multitudes of activities will inevitably lead to conflicts as this sector 
becomes increasingly crowded. While a set of international treaties have, so far, 
been able to manage disputes that have come up in Outer Space, they are not 
specific enough for these new challenges. Hence, the existing rules of the road for 
Outer Space will need to be adapted for the modern times. 
This Article attempts to address this need. It begins by setting a new boundary 
for Outer Space by using existing perspectives and a concept from the Law of the 
Sea. Then, through the creation of a decision tree framework, this Article shows 
how the appropriate jurisdictional authority for a particular dispute in Outer 
Space can be determined through the facts and circumstances of the case. 
While the analysis is reactionary by nature (i.e., it depends on the facts of the 
incident), these guidelines can be used to proactively think about how the 
jurisdictional issue might be resolved if a conflict were to arise. As the framework 
dynamically assigns governing authority by the circumstances of the case, it is 
compatible with the Outer Space Treaty’s core principle that Outer Space is the 
domain of all humankind and “not subject to national appropriation.”
154
  
Through this solution, some of the unknown risks associated with Outer Space 
activities can be removed—enabling parties to better understand the resulting 
dispute procedures that might arise. With more and more commercial entities and 
private individuals gearing up to participate in this heavenly realm, the goal of 
these rules is to ensure that conflicts in Outer Space could be, at least 
procedurally, solved through a uniform and consistent approach. It is this 
Article’s hope that, with these reassurances, different nations and entities will 
continue to boldly explore Outer Space while feeling less constrained by legal 
uncertainties. With this predictability, dreamers, innovators, and explorers would 
have one fewer item to worry about as they continue their quests in unlocking 
secrets and deriving new benefits for humanity in this final frontier. 
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